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Summary  findings
For the past two decades, Chile has consistently pursued  agents whose consumption and investment decisions
a course of macroeconomic stabilization and deep  reflect intertemporal optimization with perfect foresight.
economic reform. But in recent years, real exchange rate  This framework makes it possible to distinguish
appreciation and persistent moderate inflation have  meaningfully between permanent and transitory policy
become key concerns for Chilean policymakers,  changes, as well as between changes that are or are not
suggesting the need for further  fiscal and monetary  anticipated.
retrenchment.  Simulations show that a balanced-budget fiscal
lUsing  an open-economy, dynamic rational-  contraction  leads to a modest real depreciation, which is
expectations macroeconomic model applied to Chile,  sharper in the short term (especially if the contraction is
Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven analyze and quantify the  temporary). At the same time, this type of fiscal
macroeconomic impact of fiscal and monetary  retrenchment causes a temporary  deterioration  of the
retrenchment.  current account.
Several features of the model are essential for a  An orthodox  money-based disinflation implemented
realistic assessment of the effects of fiscal and monetary  by halving the growth  rate of base money leads to a
policy shifts in Chile: backward indexation of wages,  sharp real appreciation  in the near term, with steep
consolidation of the central bank and the general  output and employment costs in the short run, but it also
government, and the coexistence of (1) liquidity-  causes a transitory improvement in the current account.
constrained consumers and firms with (2) unconstrained
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"Chile  is  often  presented  as  the  model  for  the  programs  of  economic
restructuring,  market liberalization and stabilization that are being urged on other
countries within Latin America and in Eastern  Europe"  (Bosworth. Laban and
Dornbusch,  1994. p.  1).
This paper derives and quantifies impact and long-term effects of fiscal and monetary policies in
a developing open economy in a framework of a dynamic forward-looking general-equilibrium model.
The  paradigmatic role  attributed to  the  Chilean experience  by  many  policy makers  and economists,
reflected by the quotation, justifies choosing Chile for illustrating the consequences of aggregate demand
policies in such a framework.'
Chile has pursued a program of drastic stabilization and deep structural  reforms since the mid
1970s.  Though fiscal stability was achieved early  on,  sustained single-digit inflation has eluded Chile
to date.  The 1978-81 boom was fueled by massive capital inflows, a private-sector spending frenzy, an
exchange-rate based stabilization, and high real wage growth as a  result of backward-looking nominal
wage indexation.  The ensuing bust was triggered  by adverse  terms-of-trade  and foreign  interest rate
shocks topped by  the  1982 debt crisis.  The deep  1982-83 recession led to massive loan defaults and
bankruptcies, forcing the central bank to intervene in financial institutions to avoid a generalized financial
crisis, giving rise to huge quasi-fiscal deficits during  1982-85.  During the same period the role of the
exchange rate as nominal anchor  was abandoned and nominal wages were de-indexed,  allowing for  a
massive real exchange rate devaluation and real wage squeeze.  The elimination of quasi-fiscal deficits
and a conservative fiscal stance since  1987 was combined with an active exchange rate policy geared
toward maintaining competitiveness of the traded-goods producing sectors, based on a crawling peg within
bands of increasing width.  Foreign debt was reduced massively by market-based buy-backs and debt-
equity swaps.  The conservative macroeconomic framework was continued by the democratically elected
government which succeeded the military regime in 1990.
Structural adjustment was accomplished to a large degree already during the  1970s, combining
deregulation  of  domestic  goods,  labor  and  financial  markets  with  deep  external  trade  reform,  and
subsequent external financial liberalization.  Chile's  most innovative structural reform  was the gradual
substitution of  a  privately-managed,  fully-funded  pension system  for  a  state pay-as-you-go  scheme,
starting  in  1981.  At  the  same  time,  Chile's  major  policy  mistake  was  implementing  financial
liberalization without putting  in place adequate financial regulation  and supervision  --  an error  that
contributed significantly to overborrowing  in the early  1980s and the subsequent financial crisis.  After
correcting the latter mistake and re-privatizing intervened banks, privatization was taken a further  step
during the  1980s by extending it to part of health care, public utilities,  and infrastructure.
National  and foreign  saving reacted  slowly but steadily to  fiscal  adjustment,  debt  reduction,
privatization,  and pension reform.  In the late  1980s Chile  --  leading the group  of highly indebted
countries  --  regained  access to  voluntary foreign  lending flows  and foreign  investment.  Domestic
investment, spurred by low wages, macroeconomic stability, and a market-friendly environment, reached
historically unprecedented levels in the 1990s.  GDP growth has been high since 1986, based initially on
' For detailed  accounts of Chile's macroeconomic  policies and outcomes during  the last 20 years see the books by Edwards
and Cox-Edwards (1987), Morande and Schmidt-Hebbel (1987), and Bosworth, Labin and Dornbusch (1994) as weU as the
references cited therein.2
a recovery of capacity  --  full employment  was reached in  1992 after 20 years of abnormally  high
unemployment  --  and subsequently  on high investment  levels and efficiency  gains.
Among  Chile's policy issues of continuing  relevance,  this paper addresses  two macroeconomic
questions. The first concerns  the possible  contribution  of additional  fiscal adjustment  to macroeconomic
equilibrium  in general  and a more competitive  exchange  rate in particular. Due to the real exchange  rate
appreciation  observed in recent years  --  resulting from higher domestic spending  and massive  capital
inflows --  it has been argued and counter-argued  (see Arrau, Quiroz, and Chumacero, 1992, for a
review)  that further fiscal adjustment  could offset part of the ongoing appreciation. To shed more light
on this issue, we analyze here the effects of permanent  and temporary, anticipated  and unanticipated
reductions  in public consumption  matched  by lower general taxation. 2
The second policy issue addressed  in this paper is about  the macroeconomic  effects of reducing
inflation  from double to single-digit  levels.  Achieving  this policy objective --  favored by both policy
makers  (as espoused  by the Chilean President  in his May 1994  address  to Congress)  and economists  (for
instance  Corbo and Fischer, 1994) --  is not trivial in an economy as heavily indexed  as Chile.  We
focus here on an orthodox anti-inflation  policy based exclusively  on contractionary monetary policy,
analyzing  the effects of permanent  and temporary, anticipated  and unanticipated  reductions  in monetary
growth rates.
This paper makes  use of a macroeconomic  general-equilibrium  model  fully  parameterized  for the
Chilean economy.  The model is firmly based on microanalytic  foundations,  introducing  critical real-
world features  --  such as short-run wage rigidities and liquidity constraints  --  that generate deviations
from the frictionless  full-employment  equilibrium  of the unconstrained  neoclassical  paradigm. Rational
expectations  are assumed  explicitly,  so that short-term  equilibria  depend  on current and anticipated  future
paths of policy and external variables. The simulations  show impact,  transition, and steady-state  effects
of policy  shifts. The model is an application  to Chile of previous  work on external  shocks, fiscal policy,
and monetary  policy  in representative  open economies  (Schmidt-Hebbel  and Serven, 1994a,b, 1995). To
our knowledge  this is the first attempt at constructing  and using a dynamic  macroeconomic  model for a
developing  country consistent with optimizing behavior embedding rational expectations, as well as
desirable short-term and  stationary equilibrium properties.  A  second  paper explores Chile's
macroeconomic  response  to structural and external shocks  (Schmidt-Hebbel  and Serven. 1994c).
Section  2 spells out the model  structure  and discusses  the model's  dynamics  and steady  state. The
model  distinguishes  among  three agents: the domestic  private sector, the consolidated  public  sector, and
the external  sector. The private sector (households  and firms) consists  of one group of intertemporally-
optimizing agents and another of liquidity-constrained  (or myopic) agents.  The domestic economy
produces  a single  good, while  the rest of the world produces  both an intermediate  input and a final good;
the three goods  are imperfect  substitutes. The one-sector  assumption  on the supply side implies  that the
model  does not distinguish  between  the real exchange  rate and the terms of trade, and that the latter are
affected  by domestic  policies. Resource  allocation  effects --  say between  traded and non-traded  goods-
2 Thus,  the focus is on balanced-budget fiscal retrenchment.  However, the term  "fiscal adjustment" is often used to refer
instead to a change in the publc  deficit, that still leaves a fiscal gap (positive or negative) to be financed via debt or  money
printing.  But in an intertemporal framework such as ours, permanent debt-financed deficits are not feasible because they would
ultimately violate the government's  solvency constraint.  Under  money financing, by contrast,  a nonzero public deficit could
persist into the distant future (provided the inflation tax base is sufficientdy  large), but changes in the deficit would involve both
a fiscal and a monetary policy element. In order to separate both. we therefore focus on the balanced-budget fiscal retrenchment.3
producing  sectors -- are also ruled out by our highly aggregated  production  structure. The asset menu
distinguishes  among  foreign assets (net of foreign debt), domestic  government  bonds, domestic  equity,
and domestic  money. Asset  markets, as well  as the domestic  goods market, clear instantly  and are driven
by forward-looking  behavior  under perfect  foresight. In contrast, the labor market  can display  real and/or
nominal  wage inertia, giving rise to persistent (but temporary) deviations  from full employment.
The dynamics  of the model are characterized  by the combination  of backward-looking  dynamic
equations describing the time paths of predetermined  variables (asset stocks and the real wage) and
forward-looking  equations  describing  the trajectory of asset prices.  The model displays hysteresis and
thus its steady  state is path-dependent:  it is affected  by the initial  conditions  and the entire adjustment  path
followed  by the economy  in response  to a shock. Transitory disturbances  can therefore have  permanent
effects, whose  magnitude  depends  on key parameters  determining  the speed of adjustment  of the system.
The numerical  solution  of the model poses a two-point  boundary-value  problem.
Section 3 presents simulation  results for the two sets of contractionary  domestic policies and
discusses  their relevance  to the Chilean  experience. Section  4 concludes.
2.  THE MODEL
The economy  produces  one single  final good, which can be used for consumption  and investment
at home, or  sold abroad.  This good is an imperfect substitute for the foreign final good, and its
production  requires the use of an imported intermediate  input.
Domestic  private agents  hold four assets: money,  domestic  debt issued  by the consolidated  public
sector (i.e., the government  plus the central bank), foreign assets, and equity claims on the domestic
capital stock.  The public sector also holds foreign assets. 3 Money allows for inflationary  finance of
budget  deficits. There are no restrictions  to capital mobility  and in the absence  of risk and uncertainty,
all non-monetary  assets  are assumed  to be perfect substitutes. Hence  anticipated  asset returns satisfy  the
corresponding  uncovered parity conditions.  Foreigners hold domestic equity but not domestic public
debt.
Both goods and asset markets  clear continuously. In contrast, the labor market does not clear
instantaneously  due to real and/or nominal wage rigidity.  Wages are indexed to current and past
consumer price  inflation, and  react  slowly to  deviations from full employment. Although in  a
simultaneous  model  such as ours no specific  equation  determines  any particular  variable,  equality  between
demand and supply for the domestic  good can be viewed as determining  the real exchange  rate. Given
the latter, and with a  flexible nominal exchange rate regime, money market equilibrium with an
exogenously  set money  supply then determines  the nominal exchange  rate.
The dynamics of the model arise from two basic sources: the accumulation  of  assets and
liabilities,  dictated by stock-flow  consistency  of the sectoral budget  constraints,  and the forward-looking
behavior  of private agents. Expectations  are formed  rationally,  which in this context  of certainty  amounts
' Foreign assets held by the domestic private and public sectors are net assets (equal to gross foreign reserves plus other
gross foreign assets less gross foreign liabilities) and therefore can have either sign.4
to perfect foresight.  Thus,  anticipated and realized values of the variables can only differ at the time of
unexpected shocks or due to the arrival of new information about the future paths of exogenous variables.
Behavioral rules combine explicitly two benchmark  specifications:  neoclassical unconstrained,
intertemporally-optimizing  firms  and  consumers,  and  Keynesian  liquidity-constrained  firms  and
households, along with wage inflexibility. 4 Following the standard theory of investment under convex
adjustment costs (Lucas,  1967, Treadway,  1969), unconstrained firms maximize their market value and
link their investment decisions to Tobin's  q (Tobin,  1969), i.e., the present value of the additional profits
associated with the marginal unit of capital relative to its installation cost (Hayashi, 1982).  Unconstrained
consumers  gear  consumption  to  their  permanent  income,  as  derived  from  intertemporal  utility
maximization in Ramsey fashion (Ramsey,  1928).  In contrast,  constrained firms (consumers) gear their
investment (consumption) expenditure to their current profits (disposable income).
Technology and preferences are kept as simple as possible  --  mostly by assuming unit elasticities
of substitution.  Two-stage  budgeting  in consumption  and  investment allows  separation between the
determination of expenditure and  its allocation to domestic and foreign goods (thus avoiding the use of
ad-hoc import functions).  Harrod-neutral technical progress ensures the existence of steady-state growth,
at a level given by the sum of the rates of technical progress and population growth.
The model's detailed structure is introduced next, starting with sector flow budget constraints and
market equilibrium conditions.  Behavioral equations for firms,  consumers,  the public sector,  and the
external sector follow.  Variable notation and definitions are summarized in Table 1.  All stock and flow
variables other than prices and interest rates are scaled to the labor force in efficiency units. 5 The model
is written in continuous time.  Dots over variables denote right-hand time derivatives.
2.1  Budgzet  Constraints
There  are three  basic agents in the model: the consolidated public sector,  the domestic private
sector, and the external  sector.  The first includes the non-financial and financial (central bank) public
sectors,  the  second  aggregates  private  firms  and  consumers,  and  the  third  adds  foreign  investors,
creditors, and trade partners.  While some further disaggregation between firms and consumers is implicit
below, we do  not need it at this stage.  The budget constraints for each of the three  type of agents are
written equating above-the-line current account surpluses with below-the-line increases in net real asset
holdings per  effective  labor force  unit.  Therefore  above-the-line  interest flows are  adjusted  for  the
changes in real asset holdings per effective labor unit due to growth in effective labor (g) and inflation.
Public revenue includes conventional taxes, unrequited foreign transfers, growth-adjusted interest
earnings from public assets held abroad, and the return on base money.  The latter equals the sum of the
inflation tax and the monetary revenue due to the growth of efficiency labor units.  Public expenditure
includes public consumption, which is assumed to fall entirely on domestic goods, an investment subsidy
4 Export demand and wage setting are the only behavioral equations in the model that do not follow (explicitly or implicitly)
from first principles.
'  Labor force in efficiency units is the actual labor force augmented by Harrod-neutral technical progress (see table  1).5
TABLE 1:  NOTATION AND DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
I  . Labor  and  Employment
L  Absolute employment
LF  =  LF,, exp(pg  t)  Absolute  labor  force
LFo  Base-period absolute labor force
N  =  L exp(tg t)  Absolute employment in efficiency units
NF =  LF exp(tg t)  LFo exp(g t)  Absolute labor force in efficiency units
pg  Population growth rate
tg  Harrod-neutral  technical progress  rate
g  pg +  tg  Growth rate of absolute labor force in efficiency units
t  Time index
IL/LF  =  N/NF  Employment (relative to labor force)
Id  Labor  demand (relative to labor force)
2.  General Notation
All stock and flow variables  other than interest  rates are defined in real terms.  Current-price  domestic (external)
income and transfer flows and prices are deflated by the price of the domestic good (external price deflator).  All stock and flow
variables other than prices and interest rates are defined in terms of units of effective labor force.  Domestic (external) relative
prices are measured in real domestic (external) currency units.  A dot over a variable denotes its right-hand time derivative.
3.  Income, Transfer and Capital Flows
Domestic:
d  Dividends paid
op  Operational profits
td  Taxes
yd  Private disposable income
prem  Profit remittances abroad
External:
ftrg  Foreign transfers to the public sector
ftrp  Foreign transfers to the private sector
yf  Foreign income
dfi  Direct foreign investment
4.  Stocks
Domestic:
a  Non-human wealth of the private sector
bg  Domestic debt of the public sector
fe  Stock of domestic equity (shares in domestic firms) held by foreigners
hb  Domestic base money
hu  Human wealth of the private sector
k  Physical capital
pvig  Present value of government investment subsidy
pvihh  Present value of cost of holding money
External:
fbg  Foreign assets held by the public sector
fbp  Foreign assets held by the private sector6
TABLE 1 (Cont.)
5.  Goods Flows
y  Gross output of final goods
cp  Private aggregate consumption
cmp  Private imported-goods consumption
cnp  Private national-goods consumption
cng  Public national-goods consumption
inv  Gross domestic investment
in  Private national-goods investment
im  Private imported-goods investment
ig  Public investment subsidy
iac  Investment adjustment costs
x  Exports
mr  Interrnediate imports
6.  Various Rates
Domestic (External) Rates:
i (if)  Nominal interest rate on public debt (foreign assets/liabilities)
r (rf)  Real interest rate on public debt (foreign assets/liabilities)
i-r (if-rf)  Anticipated domestic (external) inflation rate
nmg  Rate of growth of the nominal money stock
7.  Goods Prices
Domestic (all relative to the price of the domestic final good):
pc  Private aggregate consumption deflator
pi  Aggregate investment deflator
External (all relative to the price of the foreign final good):
pcmp  Private imported-goods consumption deflator
pim  Imported-goods investment deflator
pmr  Intermediate imports deflator
px  Deflator of export-competing goods
8.  Other  Prices
Domestic Prices:
q  Real equity price (Tobin's q) in units of domestic output
v  Real wage per effective labor unit
W  Nominal wage per  labor unit
PC  Nomninal  private consumption deflator
Real Exchange Rate:
e  =  (E P)/P  Real exchange rate
E  Nominal exchange rate
p  Nominal price of the domestic good
P'  Nominal external deflator (foreign price level)7
paid to domestic firms, 6 and interest paid on the outstanding  stock of domestic  public debt.  Revenues
include  direct taxes, interest  on net foreign  assets  of the public  sector, and the inflation  tax. The resulting
adjusted operational  surplus of the consolidated  public sector finances acquisition  of foreign assets and
retirement of base money and domestic  debt:
(1)
[td  + e  ftrg  - cng  - piig]  - (r-g)bg  +  (g+P/P)hb+  e(rf  - g)fbg  =  efbg  - bg  - fib
The external sector budget constraint  --  the balance of payments identity  --  reflects trade in
goods  and non-factor  services,  unrequited  transfer payments  to both the public and private sectors, loans
from both domestic sectors, and foreign investment  flows toward the private sector as well as profit
remittances  from the latter.  Therefore, the adjusted  external current account  surplus and its financing,
for convenience  written in constant-price  foreign  currency units, is the following:
(2)
[  - pcmp  cmp  - pim  im  - pmr mr  + ftrg  + ftrp  + (rf-g)  [fbp  + fbg]  _  prem
(fbp + fbg) - dfi
The private sector budget constraint  reflects the assumption  that private firms do all production
and make all investment  decisions, own the economy's entire capital stock, and benefit from a public
investment subsidy.  Firm ownership is split between domestic consumers and foreigners.  The
consolidated  domestic  private sector (firms and consumers)  budget  constraint is given by:
(3)
[y - pi  inv  - pi  iac  - e  pmr mr  + e  ftrp  - td  + pi  ig  - pc  cp]  - (g+P/P)hb
+ (r-g)bg  - prem  +  (rf-g)  e  fbp  = hb  + bg  - e  dfi  + e fbp
2.2  Market Equilibrium  Conditions
Equilibrium  conditions  are specified for goods, asset, and labor markets.  Continuous  market
clearing at equilibrium  goods prices and asset returns contrasts  with sluggish  wage adjustment  observed
in the labor market.
6  Public  sector  ownership  of the capital stock could  be  mimicked by introducing a  tax on profits  proportional  to the
cumulative volume of public investment. For  simplicity, we do not pursue this option here.  Also, we are implicitly assuming
that public investment is a perfect substitute for private investment.8
Goods Markets
The single  good produced  domestically  can be used for consumption  and investment  at home, or
sold abroad (thus there  is no distinction between production for domestic and export markets).  It is an
imperfect substitute for the foreign final good.  However, the economy is small in its import markets by
assumption.  Equilibrium in the market for domestic goods can be expressed:'
(4)  y  =  cnp  + cng  + in  + pi  iac  +  x
Under continuous market clearing, this  can be interpreted  as an implicit equation  for the real
exchange rate.
Asset Markets
Asset market equilibrium conditions are specified for base money, domestic bonds,  and equity
claims on the fixed capital stock.  They reflect three  features: perfect capital mobility, external interest
rate  determination in international  markets  (the small  country  assumption for  financial markets),  and
absence of uncertainty (no risk premia).  Imperfect substitutability between base money and other assets
is reflected by a conventional transactions-based demand for base money.  Domestic and foreign bonds,
as well as equity, are assumed perfect substitutes; hence their anticipated rates of return must be equalized
at each point in time.
Base money market equilibrium assumes standard Cagan-type money demand (Cagan,  1956):'
(5)  hb  =  0  y4 2  exp(' 3i)
where  ¢11 42  2  o0 *3  ￿  °.
Arbitrage between domestic and foreign bonds leads to the uncovered interest parity condition:
(6)  r  =  rf  +  -
e
Similarly,  arbitrage  between  equity and  domestic  public  bonds is reflected  by  the  following
market equilibrium condition for equity prices (Tobin's  q):
7  Note that gross output y differs from conventional national-accounts value added or GDP for two reasons: y is defined as
gross of the value of intermediate imports (e pmr mr) and gross of the value of investment adjustment costs (pi iac).
' One way to rationalize (5) would be to assume that individuals'  utility function is additively separable in consumption and
the  transaction  services  of  money,  with  the latter  increasing  with real  money and decreasing  with the  overall volume of
transactions as measured by real output. This kind of formulation rules out distortionary effects of inflationary taxation, which
in our framework is a convenient feature given that taxes are likewise assumed non-distortionary.9
(7)  q  =  q  d
k
Finally, the nominal interest rate is defined  by the standard Fisher equation:
(8)  i  = r
p
Labor Market
In the general  case, wage rigidity (nominal  and/or real) prevents  the labor market from clearing
instantaneously.  We  follow the conventional  assumption  that employment  is determined  by labor  demand:
(9)  1  =  Id
The labor market follows a wage-setting  rule, which states that nominal wages are indexed to
current and lagged  consumer  price inflation  (with weights e  and 1-0, respectively)  and also respond  to
current labor market conditions (with an elasticity w with regard to employment).  Anticipating  the
simulations,  the nominal  wage equation is written in discrete-time  form: 9
(10)  W  =  exp(tg)1w  I'  ,  - 1 W
PC)  PC2)  -
where w)> 0, 0 <  0  <  1.
2.3  Firms
Technology  is summarized  by a Cobb-Douglas  production  function  for gross output  with Harrod-
neutral technical  progress and quadratic adjustment  costs for investment. The investment  technology
combines  domestic  and imported final goods according to a Cobb-Douglas  specification,  which allows
for two-stage  budgeting.'"
There are two groups of firms.  The first group is not subject to liquidity constraints and
determines  its investment  according to the maximization  of market value  --  i.e., the present value of
future dividends  --  subject to convex adjustment  costs.  Investment is financed by equity sold to
domestic  and foreign  agents and through  the public investment  subsidy,  which takes the form of a lump-
sum transfer  of capital  goods  to private firms.  However,  as long as the subsidy  is infra-marginal,  it has
no effect whatsoever  on investment  levels  of unconstrained  firms.
9 Using the relation between the nominal wage and the real (product) wage per effective labor unit: W/P = exp(tg t) v, we
obtain, after some manipulations, the following real wage equation: v =  I - fpc/pc.1'  pc.1Ipc.j'-'  [(P.,/P.,)I(P/P.,)J' 
4 v.,.
This wage rule encompasses several interesting cases.  First,  when wi  tends to infinity, it collapses into the neoclassical full-
employment condition (1 =  1). Second, for finite c  and a  =  1, it represents the case of real wage resistance. In turn, with finite
w and 6 <  1, wages display nominal inertia.
'° Wildasin (1984) provides exact conditions under which the investment technology gives rise to a two-stage investrnent
decision. See also Hayashi and Inoue (1991) for a recent generalization with empirical applications.10
The second group of firms is restricted in its access to financial markets and gears its current
investment  to current  profits inclusive  of the public  investment  subsidy. Thus, for these constrained  firms
changes in the subsidy  will affect fixed investment  levels.
The production  technology  for gross output is described  by a Cobb-Douglas  production  function,
which allows for substitution  between  value added (capital  and labor) and intermediate  imports:
(I1)  y  =  aO  lda'  k2  m(lr  lIe2)
where  a 0 2  0,  0 ￿  a1 ,  a2 ￿  1-
Investment  adjustment  costs are defined by:
(12)  iac  =  (inv - (g+8)k)2]
where g >  0.  Adjustment  costs vanish in steady-state  equilibrium --  i.e., when gross investment  per
unit of effective  labor is just sufficient  to maintain  the capital/effective  labor ratio.  The evolution  of the
latter is described  by:
(13)  k  =  inv  - (g+a)k
Market value maximization  for unconstrained  firms, as well as current profit maximization  for
constrained firms, yields the standard marginal  productivity  conditions for variable inputs (labor and
imported  materials):"
(14)  Id  =  a1 v-l  y
(15)  mr  =  (1 - al  -a,)  (e  pmr)y'  y
Investment demand is,  as described above, a  combination  of the market-value maximizing
investment  rule of unconstrained  firms and the profit-constrained  investment  of restricted  firms:" 2
(16)  inv  k  { [  q  - p  k  g  + (g +  ) k  +  (1- 1P) [P2  O  + j
(16)  inv  =  1  [~2p  [pi  pi k  ]p]
The derivation of these conditions,  as well as of the unconstrained  component of investment in equation (16) below,
follows the standard maximization of the value of the firm,  subject to equations (11) - (13), not presented here for brevity.
12 Unconstrained investment (the content of the first large right-hand  side parenthesis) is geared to Tobin's mareinal q, i.e.,
average q minus the present value of the public investment subsidy per unit of capital (see Hayashi (1982) for general reasons
causing marginal and average q to diverge). This reflects the fact that optimal investment is determined by the addition to future
dividends of the marginal unit of capital, which excludes the subsidy due to its lump-sum nature. In contrast, the average value
of existing capital. i.e.,  the present value of the dividends associated with an  installed unit of capital, must include the subsidy.
Investment by constrained firms (the last term on the right side of (16)) rises one-for-one with the investment subsidy.11
where  ,B is the share of non-constrained firms and A,  is the marginal propensity of liquidity-constrained
firms to invest out of operational profits;  0 < ,  ,<  1
The present value of the public investment subsidy is implicitly defined by the dynamic equation:
(17)  pvig  =  (r-g)  pvig  - piig
Aggregate operational profits, which determine  investment by liquidity-constrained firms,  are:
(18)  op  =  y  - v  I  -e  pmr mr
and dividends are the sum of operational profits,  net of investment expenditure, the investment subsidy,
and the proceeds of new issues of equity:
(19)  d  =  op  - piinv  - pi  iac  + piig  + q(k  + gk)
After determining aggregate investment according to equation (16), the second-stage investment
decision involves allocating investment expenditure between domestic goods and imports, according to
a Cobb-Douglas aggregation which renders constant expenditure shares:
(20)  in  =  y pi  inv
(21)  im  (1-y)[  P  I inv
e  pum
where  Y is the share of national-goods investment in aggregate investment expenditure,  satisfying
0 <  <  I . Therefore the aggregate investment deflator is a Cobb-Douglas average of national-goods
investment prices and imported investment-goods prices:
(22)  pi  =  (epim)(I-Y
2.4  Consumers
Consumer  preferences  also  allow  two-stage  budgeting,  distinguishing between  intertemporal
aggregate  consumption  decisions and  intratemporal consumption  composition choices.  Intertemporal
preferences  reflect unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution (i.e.,  logarithmic  intertemporal utility);
intratemporal preferences also display unit elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods.
Private  sector  non-human wealth  includes  four  assets:  base  money,  domestic public  bonds,
foreign assets, and equity claims on the domestic capital stock. Forward-looking consumers fully discount
from their wealth the costs of holding money balances:
(23)  a  =  hb  + bg  +  e  fbp  +  q(k-fe)  - pvihb
where the present  value of money holding costs pvihb is just  the discounted sum of interest payments
foregone on money balances, and is implicitly defined by the dynamic equation:
(24)  pvihb  = (r-g)  pvihb  - i hb12
Human  wealth is the present  value of future labor income, net of taxes, and inclusive  of current
external  transfers.' 3 Under the assumption  that individuals  can freely borrow against their future labor
income  at the going real interest  rate, the path of human  wealth is characterized  by:
(25)  hu  =  (r-g)hu  + [td  - vI  - e  ftrp]
Consumption  of non-liquidity  constrained  consumers is derived from standard maximization  of
intertemporal  utility over an infinite  horizon, subject  to the intertemporal  budget  constraint  equivalent  of
the private sector flow constraint in equation (3)  --  which is exactly consistent  with wealth  definitions
in  equations (23)  - (25).'4  Unconstrained consumers are  of  course Ricardian, internalizing the
government's intertemporal  budget  constraint  by anticipating  the entire stream of current and future tax
payments.  Because these consumers face the same discount rate as the government,' 5 and inflation
taxation  is non-distortionary,  they  are indifferent  among  tax, debt, or money  financing. Thus  government
debt, although  included in equation (23), ultimately  "is not wealth" (Barro, 1974).
Total private consumption demand is an  aggregate of consumption by  unconstrained and
constrained  consumers. The latter hold no assets and consume  their current net labor income:' 6
(26)  cp  =  (X2  - g)  a  +  (X 2_ g)  hu  + (1Y
PC  PC  P
where O  s A,  s  I is the share of unconstrained  consumers, and X is the subjective  discount  rate. Thus,
if all consumers  are unconstrained,  consumption  depends  only on the sum of human  and financial  wealth,
and disposable  income  plays no role.
Disposable  income is defined by:
(27)  yd  =  v  I  + e  ftrp  - td
After determining  aggregate  private consumption  levels according  to equation  (26), the second-
stage private consumption  decision  allocates  it between  domestic  goods  and imports,  according  to Cobb-
Douglas  intratemporal  preferences:
(28)  cnp  =  r pc cp
''  For expositional convenience, all taxes and transfers have been lumped together in the human capital flow equation.  Since
both accrue in lump-sum fashion, this is of no consequence for the model's  properties.
'4  As before,  the analytical derivations are  standard and can be  omitted.  Solving the maximization problem yields  the
standard result that private consumption of unconstrained households is equal to the subjective discount rate  (net of effective
labor growth) times total (human and non-human) wealth.
s The assumption  of equal discount rates is crucial for Ricardian equivalence to hold.  Higher private sector discount rates,
whether due to finite lifetimes (reflected by a given probability of  death,  as  in Blanchard,  1985) or  to a risk premium  on
consumers' debt  relative to the borrowing  cost of the government (e.g.,  McKibbin and Sachs,  1989)  would cause  Ricardian
equivalence to break down.
"6  For discussion and empirical analyses of the implications of liquidity constraints for consumer behavior - as well as for
Ricardian equivalence - see, for example,  Hayashi (1985), Hubbard and Judd (1986), Bernheim (1987), Leiderman and Blejer
(1988), and Seater (1993).13
(29)  cmp  =  (1 - Tle  0  mP1cp
e  pcmp
where O  <￿  s  1 is the share of national-goods  in aggregate  private consumption  expenditure. Therefore
the aggregate  private  consumption  deflator is a Cobb-Douglas  index  of national-goods  prices and imported
consumption  goods  prices:
(30)  pc  =  (e pcmp)(2' ')
2.5  Government
The public sector determines policy exogenously, thus public consumption and investment
expenditures  are given.  To finance its activity, the public sector can choose among taxes, money,
domestic  debt, or external borrowing (or any combination  of them).
The accumulation  of per capita real balances  can be characterized  as:
(31)  hb  =  [nmg  - (P/P)  - g]hb
where it is worth noting that the rate of nominal money  growth nmg will be endogenous  under money
finance of the deficit and exogenous  otherwise.
2.6  Foreigners
The demand  by foreigners  for the domestically  produced  good is given by a conventional  export
function,  which displays  inertia  and embodies  imperfect  substitution  between  the national  and the foreign
final good and a normal relation  to foreign income:
(32)  x  =  pI (e  px)P2 yfP'  xP4
where  PI)  P2 p3P  p4  2  0.
Foreigners can also hold domestic equity. Rather than going into the details of their portfolio
allocation  problem,  we assume  that at every instant  foreign investors  use dfi units of foreign  currency  (in
real per capita  terms) to purchase  domestic  shares, whose price in terms of domestic  output is q.  Hence
foreign investors' per-capita  holdings of equity evolve according  to the equation:
(33)edfi
(33)  fe  =  - g  fe
q
In turn, profit repatriation  equals  the total volume  of dividends  earned  by foreign  investors,  which
is given by the product  of the share of foreign-held  equity and total dividends:
(34)  prem  =  fe  d
k14
2.7  The Steady State, Dynamics. and Model Solution
The long-run  equilibrium of the model is characterized by constant output in per capita terms (so
that long-run growth equals the growth rate of the effective labor force), constant asset stocks in real per
capita terms, constant asset prices (i.e.,  Tobin's q and the real exchange rate), and constant real wages
with full employment.  Thus,  the government's  budget (inclusive of seigniorage revenue) must be
balanced, and the current account deficit must equal the exogenously  given flow of foreign investment,
which in turn is just sufficient to keep foreign equity holdings (in real per capita terms) unchanged.
Since the per capita real money stock is constant, long run inflation  equals the rate of expansion
of per capita nominal  balances nmg - g.  In turn, with a constant  real exchange rate, domestic and foreign
real interest rates are equalized by  uncovered interest parity,  and nominal exchange depreciation is
determined  by the difference  between domestic and foreign inflation. Hence, across steady states changes
in the rate of money growth are fully reflected in the inflation rate (and thus in the nominal interest rate)
and in the rate of nominal  depreciation.
By  combining the  model's  equations, the  steady-state equilibrium can  be  reduced  to  two
independent  equations in the real exchange rate, real wealth, and the real interest rate: a goods market
equilibrium condition  and a zero private wealth accumulation  condition (in real per capita terms).  They
jointly imply a constant stock of per capita net foreign assets.  Goods market equilibrium defines an
inverse long-run  relationship  between real wealth and the real exchange rate: higher wealth raises private
consumption  demand and requires a real exchange rate appreciation  to clear the domestic goods market.
In turn, real wealth accumulation can cease only when per capita consumption equals the per
capita return on wealth. This poses the well-known  requirement that, for a steady state to exist, the rate
of time preference must equal  the exogenously given world interest rate." 1 But then the zero-wealth
accumulation  condition  provides no information  whatsoever on the steady-state level  of wealth: with the
return on wealth being entirely consumed, any wealth stock is self-replicating. We are thus left only with
the goods market equilibrium condition to determine both long-run wealth and the real exchange rate --
an obviously impossible  task.
This means that the steady-state  wealth stock must be found  from the economy's initial  conditions
and from its history of wealth accumulation or de-accumulation  along the adjustment path.  Hence the
steady-state  values of wealth and the real exchange  rate (and therefore all other variables related to them)
depend not only on the long-run values of the exogenous variables, but also on the particular trajectory
followed by the economy.  In other words, the model exhibits hysteresis.  As noted bv Giavazzi and
Wyplosz  (1984),  this follows from the assumption of forward-looking  consumption  behavior  derived from
intertemporal optimization by infinitely-lived households with a constant rate of time preference and
facing perfect capital markets.
Nevertheless,  certain important features of the steady state can easily be determined." 1 Long-run
equilibrium is characterized by full employment and a constant capital stock in per capita terms.  From
(13), gross investment is just inv =  (g+6)k,  and adjustment  costs are identically zero (from (12)).  In
turn, from (7), (17), (18) and (19), Tobin's q in steady state is given by:
'  Recall  that, because  of perfect  asset  substitutability,  the per capita  real return on wealth  is just equal to the real interest
rate (net of effective  labor force growth) times the wealth stock. In  turn, steady-state  consumption  equals the rate of time
preference  (also  net of effective  labor force  growth) times  the wealth  stock.
'  Giavazzi and Wyplosz  (1985) provide a method  to solve  analytically  certain linear models  with hysteresis. They show
that the long-run  equilibrium  depends  on initial conditions  and on the speed  of adjustment  of the system.  Since our model  is
nonlinear,  however.  a comparable  solution  technique  is not available.'5
Fk-Pi  (g+8) (35)  q  =___  __  +  pvig/k
(rf -g)
where Fk is the marginal productivity of capital.9
It is important  to note that with some firms liquidity constrained (i.e.,  3,  < 1), in the steady state
q does not equal the subsidy-inclusive  price of capital goods, nor does Fk equal the user cost of capital.
Intuitively, with binding liquidity constraints firms cannot invest as much as they would want and
therefore  cannot close the gap between the shadow value of one additional unit of capital and its cost.
Thus, provided the marginal propensity to invest of constrained firms (12  in (16)) is not too large,'  Fk
must exceed the user cost, and q must exceed the price of capital goods plus the investment subsidy:
(36)  Fk,= pi  [(rf  +)  + fl
where f  >  0 is a term that depends positively on the adjustment cost coefficient a  and the rate of
depreciation  of capital, and negatively on B,, 8,  and the investment  subsidy. 2" Tobin's q becomes:
(37)  q  p= [(irf+o)  +  f  ig/k
(rf +8)
It is important to  note that,  regardless of whether firms are liquidity-constrained  or not, the
steady-state  displays a negative association  between the real exchange  rate and the capital stock. This can
be seen  from (36): given a capital stock, Fk is a decreasing function of the real exchange rate because of
imported  materials in production, while pi is an increasing function of the real exchange rate due to the
import content of capital.  Hence, across steady states, a real depreciation unambiguously  reduces the
capital stock, and (from (11) and (14)) output and the real wage.  The long-run values of all these
variables  depend on initial conditions and on the economy's adjustment path.'  In turn, (36) and (37)
further imply that, for any given long-run real exchange rate, the economy's capital stock, output and
real wage will be lower under liquidity constraints than in the fully unconstrained  case.
An important implication  of the model's hysteresis property is that even transitory disturbances
have long-run  effects. For the case of fiscal policy, this has been recently highlighted  by Turnovsky and
Sen (1991).'  In our model even transitory monetary  disturbances can have permanent real effects: with
some consumers liquidity constrained (or myopic), a transitory increase in inflationary taxation matched
"9 If no firms  are liquidity  constrained  (i.e.,  a,  =1 in (16)), then (16) further  guarantees  that marginal  q equals the price of
capital  goods  or. equivalently,  that  average  q equals  the price of capital  plus the unit  investment  subsidy  (i.e., q = pi + pvig/k).
Thus, from  the above equation  the marginal  product  of capital  equals its user cost: F,  = pi (rf+5).
23 The exact  condition  is B, <  (g+6)1(rf  +-6)  - ig/(ay),
21 The  exact  expression  for f is f =  {[3,(rfi+6)  + (1-,B)  2,u (rf-g)(g+6)l J LB + (I-03,) ,u (rf-g)W3 2 +z/1ct)]) - (rf-6),  where
z *  igly is the public  investmentlgross  output ratio.
2  This is in contrast  to similar  dynamic  models (e.g., Sachs  (1983), Giavazui  et al. (1982)), where capital  goods have no
import content,  thus the steady-state  marginal  product  of capital  (and the capital  stock and real output)  depends  only on the
relative price of materials in terms  of domestic  goods  (e  pmr here).  Here the import  content of capital  goods  creates  a negative
relationship  between the  real exchange  rate  and F,,  even  for  a given  real  cost of imported  materials.  Gavin  (1991)  and Serven
(1991)  show that  tuis has important  consequences  for  the  effects  of macroeconomic  policies  on investment.
D  Turnovskv  and Sen (1991)  use a non-monetary  model  with intertemporaily  optimizing  consumers  to show  that  transitory
fiscal disturbances  have  long-run  effects.  Their  result  depends  criticaUy on the  endogeneiry  of labor supply,  making  long-run
employment  endogenous.  In  our  case,  the  dependence  of  the long-run  capital  stock  on  the  real  exchange  rate  ensures  that
transitory  fiscal  shocks  have  permanent  effects  despite  constant  full-employment  across  steady states.16
by a reduction in direct taxes will raise disposable income and consumption, leading to reduced wealth
accumulation and eventually causing a fall in long-run wealth and a permanent real depreciation. 24
The precise dynamics of the model  depend on how the public deficit is financed.  With money
or tax finance, the model is driven by ten dynamic equations.  Four describe the time paths of pre-
determined  variables: the capital stock, private foreign assets, foreign equity  holdings, and the real wage.
At each moment in time, these variables are given by  current and past values of endogenous and
exogenous variables. Further, these predetermined  variables must satisfy well-defined  initial conditions.
Under debt (domestic  or foreign) finance, a fifth dynamic equation describes  the time path of the relevant
debt stock.
The remaining dynamic equations describe the time paths of 'jumping' variables: Tobin's q, the
real exchange  rate, real money balances, human wealth, the present value of the investment subsidy, and
the present value of the cost of holding money.  They are not predetermined  and can react freely to
'news'  about current and future values of exogenous  variables; their equilibrium values at any point in
time depend on the entire future anticipated path of the forcing variables.  For the complete dynamic
system not to explode, these  jumping variables  have to satisfy certain terminal  (transversality)  conditions.
Solving the model basically amounts to finding initial values for the non-predetermined  variables such
that, following a shock, the model will converge to a new stationary equilibrium. The necessary and
sufficient  conditions  for the existence and uniqueness of such initial values in linear models of this type
have been investigated  in the literature,'  though this is not the case for large non-linear models like this
one."  While a formal proof of stability cannot be provided, numerically the model was always found
to converge to the new long-run equilibrium under reasonable parameter values.
The requirement that the predetermined variables satisfy initial conditions, while the jumping
variables must satisfy terminal conditions, poses a two-point boundary-value  problem.  One technique
used to obtain a numerical solution is the "multiple shooting" method proposed by Lipton et al. (1982).
A second solution technique is the  "extended path" algorithm of Fair and Taylor (1983).  For the
simulations below, we combine both techniques.  First, we solve the model over an arbitrarily chosen
time horizon using multiple shooting.  To prevent the solution from being distorted by the choice of too
short a time horizon (causing the model to reach the steady state too early), we then extend the horizon
and recompute the solution path; we keep doing this until the resulting changes in the solution trajectory
of the endogenous  variables fall below a certain tolerance, 27 at which time the process stops. In practice,
the length  of the simulation horizon required for this procedure to converge is strongly affected by two
parameters governing  the speed of adjustment of the system: the elasticity of real wages to employment
(i.e., the slope of the Phillips curve), and the magnitude of adjustment  costs for investment.
Finally, unlike other simulation methods in the literature, we solve the full non-linear model,
rather than a linearized version of it.  The reason is that the linear approximation  can be quite unreliable
when simulating  "large" shocks.
- Without liquidity constraints, a monetary acceleration (an increasc in nmg) holding constant public  expenditure would  just
amount to a change in the composition  of taxation between  the inflation tax and (present or future) direct taxes  (or  transfers),
without any effect  on wealth, consumption,  or any other real variable.
25  See Blanchard  and Kahn (1980)  and  Buiter (1984).
5  in pnnciple,  we could  lineanze  the  system  around a steady state to  deterrnine analytically the conditions  whereby  the
transiton  mau-ix  possesses  the saddle-point  property. For a tenth-order system.  however.  this would  be an intractahle task.
We used a very stuict  convergence  critenon,  requiring that the maximum relative change between solutions  in any variable
at any time penod  not exceed one-thousandth of one  percent.  This  typically  required a horizon  of  at least fifty  periods  for
convergence.17
3.  SIMULATION RESULTS
This  section briefly  summarizes  the parameterization  of the  preceding  model to  the  Chilean
economy and discusses at length its dynamic response to two sets of policy simulations: a contractionary
fiscal policy and a contractionary monetary policy.2'
3.1  Mlodel  Parameterization
Parameterization  involves  a  choice  of  values  for  the  model's  behavioral  parameters  and  a
calibration of behavioral equations and budget identities to a certain base period.  The model's behavioral
equations were estimated econometrically using a Chilean historical sample period of annual data covering
1960-1992.  These equations and the three budget constraints were calibrated to a recent historical year:
1992.  For this year steady-state equilibrium conditions were imposed, i.e.,  per capita state variables and
prices were assumed to be constant. 29 Hence the first period of our counter-factual simulations could
be interpreted as 1993, if  1992 had been a stationary equilibrium year.  In Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven
(1994c) we provide a detailed explanation of the parameterization  process,  reporting data sources, the
complete set of econometric estimations, parameter  values, calibrated base-year budget identities, base-
year steady-state values of exogenous and endogenous variables.
As discussed in section 2.7,  the speed of convergence to a new steady state and the particular
adjustment path  taken  by  the  endogenous  variables  depend  critically  on  the  values  of  certain  key
parameters,  summarized  briefly  next.  The  elasticity  of  nominal  wages  with  respect  to  current
employment (relative to the  labor force) is 1.8 (under instantaneous labor market clearing it would be
infinity).  Nominal wages are indexed to current and lagged consumer price inflation with weights 49%
and 51 %, respectively.  The quadratic adjustment cost coefficient for investment is 19.57, a large figure
that implies a very slow investment response.  The share of unconstrained agents  --  consumers and firms
--  is 55.0%  and 29.5%,  respectively,  well below the  100% share of the unconstrained  neoclassical
benchmark.  The import content of investment (37%)  is four times the import content of consumption
(9%).  Finally, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption  is restricted to one,  a value
consistent with previous econometric estimations for Chile (Schmidt-Hebbel 1987, Arrau  1989).
3.2  Simulation Features
For the  simulations, the adjusting variable for the public  sector is total taxes (td) and for  the
private sector the residual budgetary variable is foreign asset holdings (fbp).0 The simulations explore
28 Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (1994a) analyze fiscal policy under alternative means of financing in this model calibrated
for  a  prototypical  developing  economy.  Schmidt-Hebbel  and  Serven  (1994c)  explore  the  Chile  model's  response  to
permanent/temporary,  anticipated/unanticipated structural shocks, including a decline in the foreign real interest rate, an increase
in the subjective discount rate, and an increase in the rate of technical progress.  Serven (1994) explores analyticaly the impact
of fiscal disturbances in a non-monetary model closely related to ours.
2' This is a common assumption for rational expectation model simulations. It allows us to focus on the impact, transition,
and steady-state effects of policy shifts 'uncontaminated"  by the non-stationary equilibrium of the economy.  The slack variables
for the two independent budget constraints were chosen to he total taxes and foreign transfers to the government  - hence they
reflect base-year changes in per capita state variables and prices.
"O  Actual model simulations assume that the private sector intratemporal  budget constraint  (equation (3)) is the redundant
budget constraint by Wakras'  Law, hence it is excluded from the set of model equations.  (Obviously the intertemporal  budget
constraint is still used in deriving optimal private consumption levels).  Hence td and fbp are the endogenousvariables  associated18
three alternatives:  a permanent  unanticipated  (PU) policy shift (hitting the economy from period I to
terminal period T), a transitory unanticipated  (TU) policy change (hitting during periods I to 4), and a
permanent  anticipated  (PA) policy change (hitting  from period 3 to T).  For the fiscal policy simulation,
the types of policy shifts are PU and TU, while under the monetary simulation,  the policy changes  are
PU, PA, and TU.
The discussion  of the simulation  results focuses on the deviations from an initial steady-state
equilibrium (represented by period 0),  distinguishing  between the impact effects (in period 1), the
transition toward the new steady-state  equilibrium (from periods 2 to T-1), and the final steady state
(terminal  period T).  The discussion  will be based on the figures depicting  the dynamic  paths of the main
endogenous  variables.  Each figure page is divided into an upper and a lower panel, each of which
reports the dynamic  trajectories of a different endogenous  variable. The figures report trajectories of
endogenous  variables  for period 0 (the initial steady state), I to 11, T-l,  and T.'
3.3  Fiscal Contraction:  The Contribution  to Real Exchange  Rate Competitiveness
We start by considering  the effects of a public-sector  retrenchment  as reflected by a balanced-
budget  fiscal contraction. Fiscal adjustment  falls on public  consumption,  which  declines  by 2 percentage
points (pp) of initial  steady-state  output, from 7.7% to 5.7%.  Lower public spending is matched  by a
reduction in overall taxation.  The tax reduction shifts wealth from the public to the private sector,
increasing  private consumption. This transfer reduces  aggregate  expenditure  on national  goods (public
consumption  falls only on national  goods) and raises aggregate  expenditure  on imported goods (8% of
private consumption  falls on imported goods).  This expenditure-composition  effect is the main direct
consequence  of the balanced-budget  fiscal contraction,  other than temporary effects on the behavior  of
liquidity-constrained  agents.
The expenditure switch causes a  long-term real exchange rate depreciation, a  decline in
investment  (because  imported  investment  goods  are more  expensive),  lower  output, and lower real wages.
The impact  effects  differ from the steady-state  effects: on impact  there is an aggregate  demand  reduction,
followed  by a gradual aggregate  supply contraction  due to slow disinvestment.
Consider first  the  PU policy shift occurring in  period I  and thereafter.  Lower public
consumption  raises wealth of borrowing-unconstrained  consumers, who internalize the government's
budget  constraint, and increases  disposable  income  of borrowing-constrained  consumers. As a result of
the behavior  of both groups of consumers,  the share of private consumption  in output rises immediately
by 1.9 pp, close to the steady-state  effect on private consumption  (Figure 1).
The investment/output  ratio falls by 0.05 pp in period 1, since the real depreciation  raises the
price of imported  capital. Its implication  for the level of output is a 0.4 pp steady-state  decline  (Figure
2).  At the instant  of the shock, output drops by 0.23 pp and then gradually  declines further  toward its
new steady state. The decline  is gradual  as disinvestment  proceeds  slowly  due to adjustment  costs. Note
that this decline  in gross national  output (gross of intermediate  imports)  is model-specific  and reflects  the
negative  relation  between  output and the relative price of imported  to national  goods. In a more general
to the public sector budget constraint (I)  and the external sector budget constraint (2),  respectively.
"  The  multiple-shooting extended-path simulation program was written in Gauss.  The terminal period T varies between 50
and  110 periods.19
model  with a disaggregated  production  structure  (say between  tradable and non-tradable  goods-producing
sectors), the relation  between aggregate  output and the real exchange  rate is ambiguous.
Reflecting the impact drop in aggregate demand for national goods, the real exchange rate
depreciates  by 2%, overshooting  its new long-term level.  Overshooting  is due to the fact that starting
in period 2  aggregate supply contracts as a result of disinvestment, causing a gradual and slight
appreciation  toward the new steady state, where the real exchange  rate is still 1.33% more depreciated
than in the original steady state.  What is the effect of a more competitive  exchange  rate on exports?
Given a long-term  real-exchange-rate  elasticity  of export demand  of 0.43, exports are raised by 0.58%
by the long-term  depreciation.
With unchanged  monetary  growth, the output loss in period 1 reduces money  demand, causing
inflation  to increase  temporarily  by 0.2% on impact, later converging  back to the stationary  annual level
of 14% (Figure 3).
The real wage reflects the long-term decline in labor demand  due to a falling capital stock.  In
the final steady state, the real wage is 0.22% lower than in the original equilibrium.  During the
transition, however, backward  indexation  affects it as well, as wages are indexed  to current and lagged
inflation. In period 1, higher inflation  causes real wages to fall, but not enough to preclude  a temporary
decline in employment  of 0.1 pp (Figure 4).
Recalling  that we consider here a balanced-budget  fiscal retrenchment  ruling out an increase in
public  saving -- as opposed  to a reduction in government  consumption  reflected  by higher  public saving
and, hence, by a lower first-round  current-account  deficit --  all temporary  current-account  effects stem
only from the public/private wealth transfer and its induced effects. 32 Under these conditions, the
current account  could  deteriorate  or improve  in the short run, depending  on the size of the intertemporal
elasticity  of substitution  in consumption  relative to the coefficient  of investment  adjustment  costs."  In
our case of a unit intertemporal  elasticity and high investment  adjustment  costs, the foreign-currency
current account ratio deteriorates  by 0.05 pp in period 1; the domestic-currency  current account ratio
deteriorates  by 0.1 pp of output because  of the real depreciation.'  This external  deficit reflects a de-
accumulation  of private wealth, leading to lower consumption  and output in the long term.
32 As an example of a reduced-form framework that does not consider explicitly the fiscal-financing and general-equilibrium
effects of fiscal adjustment consider the results for Chile by Marshall and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994).  Their  assessment of the
consequences of fiscal policy on the external equilibrium in Chile concludes that a one-percentage-point-of-GDP reduction in
the fiscal deficit raises the trade surplus by at most 0.29 percentage points of GDP.  This result reflects the consequencesof  an
average fiscal retrenchment consistent implicitly with a mix of lower taxes,  seignorage and debt issuance  - as well as induced
macroeconomic general-equilibrium effects  --  representative for the 1960-1988 period upon which the underlying econometric
estimation is based.
"3 The opposing influence on the saving-investment balance of intertemporal substitutability in consumption and investment
is analytically explored by Serven (1994). On the one hand, the fiscal contraction reduces investment (as noted in the text), more
so the smaller adjustment costs are. On the other hand, private consumption rises relative to output, and more so the higher the
elasticity of intertemporal  substitution in consumption,  due to the anticipation of real appreciation along the adjustment path,
which encourages substitution towards present consumption. Thus, both saving and investment decline, and the net effect on the
current account is in principle ambiguous.
3  Note that the ratio of the current account balance to output in Figure 4 shows the value of the current  account balance
in units of domestic goods (i.e.,  the product of the foreign-currency current account and the exchange rate) divided by domestic
output.  Hence this ratio reflects real exchange rate movements.  Although the initial and final steady-state values of the current
account must be the same in foreign currency units, the final steady-state level of the domestic-currency current  account ratio
is larger in magnitude than the initial level due to the accompanying real exchange rate depreciation.20
Consider now the TU fiscal contraction that hits the economy from periods I to 4.  For the
effects of temporary  shocks, the role of liquidity-constrained  consumers  and investors  is crucial. If all
consumers were unconstrained  and forward-looking  individuals, a temporary reduction in government
consumption  and taxation  would  lead  only to a modest  private  consumption  increase  and hence  would  lead
to a stronger temporarv output decline and real exchange rate depreciation, than a permanent  policy
change.  However, 45% of Chilean consumers are liquidity-constrained  and hence respond to the
temporary tax reduction by consuming  more.  Hence aggregate  private consumption  rises during the 4
periods, but by less than in the PU case analyzed  above.  Therefore output falls by more and the real
exchange rate depreciates more on impact (by 0.86% more) and in the subsequent  three periods than
under the PU fiscal contraction.
In period 5, when the fiscal contraction  is reversed, private consumption  falls back to a level
close to its steady-state  value and a large real appreciation  takes place.  This 2.2% real appreciation
between  periods 4 and 5 reduces the domestic real interest rate by 1. I pp in period 4, as the domestic
interest  rate is determined  by forward-looking  uncovered  parity with the external rate. The low period-4
interest  rate raises the human  capital  component  (future labor income  streams  discounted  at the domestic
real interest rate) of private wealth, giving rise to a temporary  aggregate-demand  boost in period 4.  As
time passes  between  periods I and 4, private wealth increases  and hence unconstrained  consumers  raise
their consumption  levels. This explains  why output starts to recover and the real exchange  rate starts to
appreciate  immediately  after period 1.
Investment,  responding  to an increase in Tobin's q, increases  on impact,  and so the investment-
output ratio peaks in period 1, increasing  0.8 pp over its initial steady state.  This is in contrast to the
decline in the investment  ratio observed in the P case in period 1, when there is an impact  decline  in q.
The decline  of output by 0.4% on impact  is stronger than in the P case.  The recession  induced
by the decline in aggregate demand is compounded  by real-wage sluggishness. Over time, output
recovers with the increase in consumption  and the downward  adjustment  in the real wage up to period
4.  Wages, influenced  by present and past inflation, fall too slowly during periods 1-3 to ensure full
employment  and rise too little in period 5 to avoid temporary over-employment. In fact, employment
and output show a similar pattern of a double cycle, with a trough in period 1, a peak in period 5, and
subsequent  oscillations  toward the new steady-state  full-employment  levels.  The highest employment
deviations from full-employment  are -0.2 pp in period I and +0.4 pp in period 5.  An output spike is
observed in period 5,  when higher employment  (as real wages are sluggish) allows output supply to
accommodate  the recovery in aggregate  demand.
Inflation accommodates  the forward-looking  changes in money demand, falling to  13.7% in
period 3, and showing  a spike of 14.8% in period 5.
The current account-output  ratio shows a  strong cycle,  closely following the patterns of
consumption,  the real exchange rate, and output.
It is important  to note that there are significant steady-state  effects when fiscal adjustment  is
permanent  (PU) while they are almost negligible  when it is temporary (TU). The reason is that the PU
policy causes a permanent  change in expenditure  from domestic to imported goods, giving rise to a
permanent  real exchange  rate depreciation  of 1.33%, an output contraction  of 0.44 pp (and thus a real
wage that is 0.22% lower than its initial  value), and higher consumption  and investment  ratios by 1.84
pp and 0.05 pp, respectively. Under a TU contraction, however, the changes in the public-private
composition  of aggregate  spending  are transitory  too.  Therefore  final steady-state  values are very close21
to  initial  steady-state  levels  for  all  variables.  The  second-order  differences  are  explained  by  the
economy's transition path. which also affects steady-state values due to the model's  hysteresis.
What is the contribution of a contractionarv fiscal policy to a real exchange rate depreciation in
Chile'?  Our results could be compared to those obtained by previous empirical studies on this question,
summarized  in Table  2.  However, one should be fully aware of the limitations of such a comparison.
First,  only three  results  in Table  2 (those  listed under  1, 2,  and 3) are based on  general-equilibrium
models that consider fiscal financing and general-equilibrium feedback effects of fiscal policies.  All other
studies  are  based  on  reduced-form  real-exchange-rate  equations  which  follow  widely  varying
specifications.  Second. data definitions, samples, and frequencies, as well as estimation and calibration
techniques, vary widely among these studies.
Bearing in mind these significant differences,  results 2 to 9 show a wide range of short and long-
term real exchange rate devaluations  --  from zero to 2.5%  --  in response to a one-percentage-point-of-
GDP fiscal contraction.  Our model results summarized in line 1, based on the distinction between impact
and  steady-state  effects  in a  context of  forward-looking  expectations,  show that  a  fiscal contraction
contributes  to a devaluation ranging between  1.0% and  1.4%  in the short term and 0.67%  and 0.01%
in the long term,  depending on how permanent the fiscal policy change is.  Our 0.67%  long-term real
exchange rate devaluation resulting from a permanent fiscal contraction is close to the 0.8%  obtained by
Arrau et al.  (1992) when using  their general-equilibrium model. 35 And it is close to the mid-point of
the  wide range  spanned  by  all  other  estimations,  based  on  one-equation models.  Our  1.0%  impact
devaluation effect is similar to three studies but differs significantly from three others.
3.4  Monetary Contraction:  Towards International Inflation
Lowering domestic inflation toward international levels is an important policy objective in Chile,
where inflation is stuck in the 11-14% annual range.  Here we consider an orthodox policy package based
exclusively on  reducing monetary growth without any supportive income policies.  This exercise  likely
represents  therefore  the  upper  bound of the  short-term  costs  to be  paid  in terms  of  lost output and
employment to achieve the benefit of a low long-term inflation level.  We consider here an instantaneous
halving of the money growth rate.  Because the non-financial public sector is consolidated here with the
central bank  --  a reasonable assumption even for Chile where the government owns the central bank and
is financially linked through transfers and profit remittances, although the bank is managed independently
from the government  --  the decline  in inflation requires that conventional taxation is substituted for
seignorage  (and  the  inflation  tax)  as the  means of  paying  for  the  unchanged  level  of  government
expenditure.
Ricardian liquidity-unconstrained consumers are indifferent between inflation and conventional
taxation (that is neutral in our framework),  whereas constrained or Keynesian consumers  look solely at
conventional taxation to determine their spending levels.  The existence of the latter group is therefore
one of the key causes for the monetary deceleration to have real effects.
'5 Due to the two-period OLG structure  of  the model by Arrau, Quiroz and Chumacero  (1992). 'I eii tcnpci  is  policy
simulation  is not  comparable  to ours. In their case  a temporary  policy shift implies  a change  that occurs  ii.  ii i,  d  ,  panning
an entire working life. say 30 years) and is reverted in "period 2" (spanning  a retirement  life).  In  '  owever, a
temporary  policy shift takes  place  tbr 4 vears.  being reverted  in periods  5 and thereafter.22
Table 2
ESTIMATES OF PERCENTAGE REAL EXCHANGE RATE DEVALUATION  EFFECTS
OF A REDUCTION IN PUBLIC SPENDING BY I PERCENTAGE POINT OF GDP  IN CHILE
Permanent  Reduction  Temporary  Reduction
Impact  Long-Term  Impact  Long-Term
1. Our Model  1.0  0.67  1.4  0.01
2. Arrau et al. (1992),  ---  ---  ---  2.5 (1.3)
nontraded  goods. with (w/o)
liquidity constraints.
(Calibrated  Structural Model)
3. Arrau et al.  (1992),  ---  1.8 (0.8)  ---  1.8 (1.0)
traded and nontraded goods,
with (w/o)  liquidity constraints.
(Calibrated Structural Model)
4.Marshall-Schmidt-Hebbel (1994)  1.1  1.1
(Estim:  1960-1988)
5.  Elbadawi-Soto (1994)  0.9  1.5
(ECM Estim:  1960-92)
6.  Arrau et al.  (1992)  1.3  0
(ECM Estim:  1977:2-1990:4)
7. Valdes et al. (1990)  0.2  0.2
(Estim:  1960-1982)
8. Corbo (1983)  0.2  0.2
(Estim:  1976-1983)
9. Le Fort (1988), Table 5, Prior 2  0.2  0
(Bayesian Estim:  1974:1-1982:4)
Note:  Arrau et al. (1992) in results 2 and 3 report general-equilibrium simulation results based on a two-
period  life-cycle consumption  model (with  and without  a group  of  liquidity-constrained consumers),
parameterized for Chile, where a temporary (permanent) fiscal policy change means a period-I  (periods
I  and 2) shift.  The other  results are based on one-equation specifications for the real exchange rate,
estimated by  error-correction  frameworks (5 and 6).  standard econometric techniques (4,  7 and 8),  or
Bayesian estimations (9).  Model results 2-4 and 6-8 are also summarized by Arrau et al.23
The second central feature determining macro adjustment in response to monetary contraction in
Chile  is nominal wage inertia or  indexation.  Lower inflation raises  real wages on impact,  causing an
output supply contraction and transitorily lower employment.  As both demand and supply of national
goods decline, the short-term effect on the real exchange rate is a priori ambiguous.
Consider  first a PU monetary contraction, when the rate of monetary growth (nmg) is reduced
permanently from 18.5 % per year to 9.5 %.  Steady-state seignorage falls though not by the entire amount
of  the  nmg  decline  because  base  money  demand  increases  in  response  to  lower  inflation.  Hence
stationary seignorage revenue (on monetary base) falls from 0.5%  of GDP  to 0.3%  of GDP,  and  tax
revenue increases from 20.2% to nearly 20.4%  of GDP  (Figure 5).
Inflation  follows  a  revealing pattern.  The  increase  in money  demand  in  response  to  lower
permanent inflation is accommodated on impact by a massive decline  in inflation, which  is augmented
by the temporary output fall in period 1.  Hence inflation falls on impact to a negative level of -2 %,  well
below the new steady-state rate of 5.0%.  a figure close to international levels (Figure 6).  Due to the
forward-looking nature of this model  --  that precludes the occurrence of capital gains from anticipated
price jumps  --  immediately after impact the inflation rate starts to converge from deflationary levels to
the long-term steady-state level.  The latter (5 %)  plus steady-state growth (4.5 %) equals the new rate of
money growth.
Due to Chile's  strong backward-looking  wage indexation, the aggregate supply contraction  is
much more severe than the contraction in aggregate demand.  The massive decline in inflation in period
I  raises the real wage on impact by  1.2%.  This causes a major employment contraction by 4.5 pp  in
period  I (Figure 7).  However, the deflation of period  I causes the real wage increase to be reverted  in
period  2,  contributing  a  fast  recovery  back  to  full  employment.  The  real  wage  undershoots  and
employment overshoots in period 3, and subsequently both variables converge toward their steady-state
levels.
On impact, the real interest rate jumps from 6.6%  to 9.5%  because the stickiness in real wages
results  in a 4.4  pp real  exchange rate depreciation between periods  I  and 2.  This  lowers the human
capital component of consumer wealth and hence consumption of non-constrained consumers  contracts.
Aggregate consumption falls by 0.6  pp.  After period  1, consumption recovers,  peaks in period 3, and
converges toward the new steady state.
Investment, responding to Tobin's q, falls in period I by 0.19 pp, as q declines on impact by  18
pp.  However,  the fall in output in period  I by 2.2  pp leads to a rise in the investment-output ratio by
0.15 pp (Figure 8).  The overall effect on aggregate demand is a contraction in period 1.
After period 1, the real interest rate falls sharply as the real exchange rate depreciates toward its
original  level.  The  human  capital  component  of  wealth  is  increasing  and  thus  consumption  of
unconstrained consumers is rising, beginning the transition to the new steady state.  Investment is falling
after period  1, as output recovers though Tobin's  q recovers as well.
Since the supply contraction strongly dominates the demand  contraction in period  1, the real
exchange rate appreciates significantly by  4.4  pp  (Figure 9).  The one-period  recession  is significant
(output  falls by  2.2  pp),  but less intense than the decline  in employment.  The reason  is that higher
intermediate imports (in response to the period I real appreciation) substitute for part of the unemployed
labor.  The subsequent evolution of output and the real exchange rate (with recovery in period 2 and peak24
in period 3) mimics the pattern of employment, which illustrates the fact that both output and the real
exchange rate are dominated by supply shifts.
The domestic-currency current-account ratio to output mimics to a large extent the pattern of the
rea; .xchange rate.  The current account ratio improves on impact of the shock by 0.65 pp.  After period
1, olltput recovers,  and the  current  account ratio worsens  and  falls below  both its original  and final
steady-state values before converging to the new steady state.
In the new steady state,  the consumption ratio is 0.01 pp  lower than in the initial steady state.
The investment ratio and output are 0.002 pp  and 0.018  pp,  respectively. higher when compared with
the original one.  The real exchange rate is 0.06 pp more appreciated. Employment returns to its original
steady-state level, so the higher output results in a 0.01 pp increase in the real wage.
It is interesting to compare the output response to a monetary contraction in our model with the
effects simulated by  a recent  study on monetary disinflation and wage contracts for  Chile by Jadresic
(1994).  Jadresic's  model combines a wage equation that reflects the institutional set-up of overlapping
labor contracts with strong wage indexation with a very simple closed-economy model in which output
is determined by  real money  holdings.  Normalizing our  results  to a  I-pp.  contraction in  monetary
growth, we are able to compare both simulation studies in Table 3.
The  dynamic  pattern  and  the quantitative  dimension  of  the output  response  to  a  permanent
monetary contraction are similar in both studies.  Output goes through a full cycle in periods 1-4.  One
slight difference  is that  after period 4,  output converges  from  above asym!-tJtically to  its long-term
equilibrium in our simulations, while it follows a sinoidal pattern in Jadresic's  results.  Our quantitative
results are dampened in comparison to Jadresic's  because we consider an open economy where changes
in the real exchange rate allow a shift in the composition of productive  inputs, which  is ruled  out in
Jadresic's  closed-economy set-up.
Table 3
ESTIMATES OF DYNAMIC OUTPUT EFFECTS  OF A PERMANENT UNANTICIPATED
REDUCTION  IN MONETARY GROWTH BY I PERCENTAGE POINT IN CHILE
(Percentage deviations from trend output levels. years after the policy change)
Year  I  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5  Lag Rn
1. Our Model  -0.25  0  +0.03  +0.02  +0.01  0
2. Jadresic (1994)  -0.41  0  +0.10  +0.01  -0.02  0
Consider now the effects of a permanent monetary contraction announced in period I to take place
starting in period 3 (the PA case).  The general qualitative features of macro adjustment in this simulation
are similar to the above P case,  but there  is one main difference:  because the monetary contraction to25
take place in period 3 is already anticipated in period  1, adjustment in goods,  asset and labor markets
starts at the moment of the policy announcement.  The adjustment is therefore spread over a larger period
(2 additional years) and hence its intensity in each additional year is lessened.
The pattern of inflation illustrates the above point.  Inflation starts falling in periods I and 2 (to
an average 8%) as money demand starts increasing in anticipation of lower inflation that will be reached
after the monetary contraction takes place in period 3.
With  lower  inflation and backward  wage indexation, the economy experiences  a recession  in
period 1. though it is considerably less intense than the recession following the first policy shift.  Output
falls by  1% and employment by 2%,  with a recovery in period 2.
When the actual monetary contraction  takes place in period 3,  interestingly  the inflation rate
approaches  its  new  steady-state  level  from  above,  which  differs  from  the  pattern  of  asymptotic
convergence from below, observed  in the PU case.  This implies that the adjustment of the real wage
(now with a peak in period 4) and employment, output, and the real exchange rate (all showing a trough
in period 4) display a cyclical pattern opposite to the one observed in the P case.  The same is true for
consumption,  investment and the current-account ratios.
In the new steady state, the consumption ratio is 0.01 pp higher than in the initial steady state.
The investment ratio is 0.001  pp higher in the final steady state.  Output is 0.02 pp higher in the new
equilibrium, and the real exchange rate is 0.05 pp more appreciated.  Higher output raises the demand
for labor.  which is reflected by a 0.01 pp increase in the real wage.
Lastly, consider the temporary unanticipated (TU) shock lasting periods I  to 4, with all agents
knowing that the contraction of the growth rate of the money supply will be reverted in period 5.  Hence
money demand  is raised significantly at the beginning of period  1, consistent with a strong decline  in
inflation to 0.8%  on impact of the shock.  Afterwards, there is a continuous reduction in money demand,
consistenit with the anticipated convergence of inflation to its new (and old) steady-state level of 14%.
Due to backward indexation, the real wage peaks on impact and then declines strongly to a trough
in period 6.  This initial increase contributes to a significant recession in period  I (output falls by  1.8 pp
and employment by  3.5  pp),  almost as intense as the PU case.  Subsequently the economy  recovers,
however unlike the PU case, employment and output peak in period 6, when real wages are lowest.
The response of the real exchange rate and the current account ratio are more dampened than in
the PU case,  with the former appreciating by 3.2 pp and the latter improving by 0.5  pp in period  1.
Finally note that the contractionary  monetary policy simulated here  --  for all three  cases  --
does not entail any  permanent resource  transfer  from the public to the private sector,  unlike the PU
change in governrnent spending considered in section 4. 1.  This explains why the final and initial steady
states are so similar under  a monetary policy change.  Any differences are only due to the influence of
the  specific  transition  path  toward  the  new stationary  equilibrium,  reflecting  the model's  hysteresis
property.
We conclude that achieving significantly lower long-term inflation can have substantial costs when
it is based on an orthodox monetary contraction in an economy where backward indexation is important.
Because we have only considered that wages are indexed to current and past inflation (using parameters26
based on Chile's historical wage behavior) without considering other forms of indexation in non-tradable
goods and in financial markets, we think that the short-term output and employmenit  costs simulated here
could be considered a lower-range estimate of the costs in Chile's higlhly indexed economy.
Two  final  points are  worth  underscoring.  First,  by  pointing out the sliort-term  costs  of an
orthodox (and massive) monetary contraction we have not answered the question about the net benefits
of such a program,  which are hard to address  in a framework based on representative agents.  Second,
we are not able to compare this anti-inflation policy exercise with an alternative program based on a more
gradualist approach combined with supportive income and exchange rate policies.
4.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper  has developed a dynamic  general equilibrium model for  the open economy.  It is
distinct in comprising several desirable features: nominal wage rigidity (allowing temporary deviations
from full employment), groups of liquidity-constrained consumers and firms,  import content of capital
goods.  and  monetary  financing of budget  deficits.  At  the same time,  the model allows  for  market
clearing  in  goods  and  asset  markets  reflecting  optimizing  forward-looking  behavior  based  on
microanalytic foundations.  The model's solution assures convergence to a dynamically stable steady-state
equilibrium.  The  model  is  parameterized  to  represent  the  Chilean  economy,  making  use  of
econometrically  estimated  parameter  values  and  a  calibration  of  behavioral  equations  and  budget
constraints to approximately fit the Chilean data for  1992.
Among Chile's macroeconomic policy issues of continuing relevance, this paper has addressed
two  questions.  The  first  refers  to  the  possible  contribution  of  additional  fiscal  adjustment  to
macroeconomic adjustment in general and a more competitive exchange rate in particular.  The second
is about the macroeconomic effects of reducing inflation from double to single-digit levels.  The model
was applied to simulate the impact, transitional, and steady-state effects of anticipated and unanticipated.
permanent and temporary policy shifts  --  a task made possible by the model's  explicit forward-looking
solution.
The fiscal contraction (lower public consumption of national goods matched by  lower taxation
so that the government's  budget remains balanced) shifts  wealth from the public to the private sector,
raising private consumption.  Aggregate expenditure on national goods falls, while aggregate expenditure
on imported goods increases and hence the real exchange rate depreciates.  When the fiscal contraction
is permanent,  the  impact devaluation  is  1.0%  for  each percentage-point-of-GDP  reductioni in public
consumption  --  slightly larger  than  the 0.67%  steady-state devaluation.  However,  when  the fiscal
contraction is temporary,  the impact devaluation is larger ( 1.4%) but almost zero  in the long term.  A
small  long-run  output  decline  and  some  temporary  unemployment  result  from  the  permanent  fiscal
contraction.
Due to backward wage indexation, monetary policy has a much stronger  effect  on short-term
output  and  employment  than  fiscal  policy.  The paper  suggests that trying  to  achieve  a  reduction  in
inflation from  14% to 5% based on a cold-turkey approach that halves monetary growth (compensated
by slightly larger conventional taxation to leave public spending unaltered)  --  not supported by income
policies or elimination of backward-looking wage indexation  --  has stiff short-run costs.  On impact
of the policy  shift,  inflation disappears,  to  start  subsequently to converge back  toward  its long-term
equilibrium level.  Due to Chile's strong backward-looking wage indexation, real wages rise substantially
on  impact,  causing  a  4.5%  decline  in employment  and  a  2.2%  output slump during  the  first  year.27
Subsequently an output and employment cycle develops  --  of an intensity and frequency that depend
on how permanent the monetary policy change is  --  that vanishes after some years when the economy
reaches its new (similar to its old) stationary full-employment equilibrium.
We conclude that applying a full-scale general-equilibrium model based on an explicit forward-
looking solution consistent with a stable steady-state equilibrium provides useful insights into the dynamic
effects of macroeconomic policies.  Having said this,  we  also acknowledge that the numerical  results
shown here are a reflection of our particular model specification and parameterization and hence should
be taken with caution.  Both specification and parameterization of our model could be refined in future
work.  Allowing for a more differentiated production structure  --  distinguishing for instance between
non-traded  and traded goods, and between importables  and exportables  --  would allow to distinguish
the real exchange rate from the terms of trade and to disentangle resource allocation effects in response
to macroeconomic policy changes.  Future parameterizations for the Chilean economy could be based on
a larger sample of post-reform data less contaminated by structural breaks.28
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